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Introduction
The U.S. fruit and vegetable industry has
been experiencing an increase in import com-
petition in the 1980s. Many regions of the world,
particularly Mexico, Chile, and the Caribbean
Basin Initiative (CBI) countries, are expanding
fruit and vegetable exports to the United States.
Fresh fruit and vegetable import volume
increased 55 percent between 1980 and 1988.
The import share of the growing U.S. fresh fruit
and vegetable market was 18.5 percent in 1988,
up from 15 percent in 1980 (Table 1).
The objectives of this paper are to discuss:
1) the reasons behind and the policy implications
of the rapid growth in fruit and vegetable
impoti, and 2) the case of the emerging relation-
ship between California and Mexico in the pro-
duction and marketing of vegetables.
Growth in Vegetable Imports and
the Lack of a Policy Consensus
on Imports
Standard assumptions regarding the effect
of imports on U.S. agricultural producers must be
modiiied when discussing the vegetable industry.
It is generally assumed that US. agricultural
producers do not operate in other countries,
indeed, that most operate in only one region of
one state. Hence, it is presumed that they will
advocate protectionist policies when faced with
signifmnt importe.
In cont~ California vegetable grower-
shippem are frequently multi-regional and obtain
products internationally, often through joint ven-
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tures with producers in other countries. Thus,
they can extend shipping seasons and sell prod-
ucts produced in several locations via one market-
ing organization. The rapid growth in muM-
location firms has contributed to a high degree of
integration of the Mexico-California-Arizona vege-
table industries. Since most vegetable crops are
not perennials, the location of production can
shift readily, based on relative production and
marketing costs and growing season. Trends in
the production and marketing arrangements of
California vegetable grower-shippers are impor-
tant because California alone accounts for half of
total U.S. production of the 15 mqjor vegetables.
Another important factor contributing to
the policy debate on fresh vegetable imports is
the position of food retailers. Since storage is
possible for most foods, seasonality of production
does not affect monthly supply. In contra@ if
imports of perishable foods are not permitted
during periods of low U.S. supply, then retailers
experience a loss in sales. In the pas$ retailers
dealt with low winter supplies of produce by
committing a limited amount of tloor space to the
produce department. However, in the 1980s
retailers have responded to the growth in con-
sumer interest in produce by significantly
expanding the space allocated to produce depart-
ments. In 1988 selling space devoted to produce
averaged 12 percent of supermarket floor space,
up horn 3 to 4 percent in the smaller stmes of
the 1970s. The average number of items handled
in a produce department has gone from 85 in
1975 to over 250 in 1988 (Pierson and Allen). In
fac$ many chains have repositioned their entire
marketing strate~ around the produce depart-
ment. Consequently, it is vital that this space be


































































a Countries included change from year to year.
b SA/CBI = South America and Caribbean Basin Initiative countries.
Source: Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Shipments by Commodities, States, and Months,
Calendar Years 1980-1988, USDA, Agricultural Marketing Service, Fruit and
Vegetable Division, various issues.
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round produce a compelling force in favor of
imports.
Given the overwhelming demand for pro-
duce imports, and the integration of many
California and Arizona producers with foreign
production operations, the possibility of achieving
significant protectionist measures is greatly
lessened. To achieve protectionist policies, pro-
ducers in the affected industries must present a
united front. Given the disparity of interests
prevailing at the shipping point level in the
vegetable industry between those that are oper-
ating internationally and those that are not this
consensus is difficult to achieve. Witness the
failure of the Cdlfornia legislature to pass a
country-of-origin labeling bill, due to dissension
within agri-industry and opposition from retail-
ers. Country-of-origin labeling legislation has
also been defeated at the national level.
The number of California firms operating
overseas, especially in Mexico, continues to grow.
The change in relative labor costs and the need
to extend shipping seasons to meet buyer demand
are not the only factors underlying this shift in
the location of production. Supply driven factors
like urban encroachment and high water costs in
southern California coastal production regions,
and increasing regulatory constraints in
Ctihforni% have also played a critical role in thk
transition (Cook and Amen).
Other forces behind the growth in import
competition in frozen and fresh vegetables
include: 1) the accelerating rate of technological
development and its international dissemination;
2) the electronic communication revolution which
allows for ready identification and analysis of
economic opportunities% and 3) the global deregu-
lation of financial flows that facilitates timely
foreign investment in identified opportunities
(Moulton and Runsten).
Hence, the attempt of debt-ridden countries
to expand vegetable exports as a means of gener-
ating foreign exchange is only one of many forces
driving the growth in U.S. fruit and vegetable
imports. Because many of these forces are
beyond the scope of national public policy, firms
must respond with adaptive strategies, rather
than simply rely on policy interventions.
Another issue influencing the U.S. response
to fruit and vegetable imports is the timing of
imports. For example, imports from Chile of
asparagus, grapes and other fruits, and kiwis and
asparagus from New Zealand are contra-seasonal.
Consequently, not only are domestic producers
presumably not harmed -by these imports, but
they may benefit as well. The argument is that
contra-seasonal imports cause consumers to
become accustomed to consuming commodities
such as asparagus, grapes and soft fruits during
the off-season, thereby increasing the overall
demand throughout the entire year.
However, the effect of contra-seasonal
imports on annual demand appears to vary by
commodity. For example, while per capita con-
sumption of grapes has increased during the
1980s, peach per capita consumption has actually
declined slightly. Certainly many other variables
beyond seasonal availability enter into consumer
purchase decisions, including perceptions of qual-
ity, relative prices, nutritional and health con-
cerns and perceptions of the price/value relation-
ship offered by any given product.
Furthermore, some of these commodities
are storeable and hence may have overlapping
shipping seasons and compete with California
product. Also affected are early and late season
varieties and regions that ship while foreign
shipping seasons get started or wind down.
In addition, since many produce items may
have a high degree of substitutability, the
expanded number of non-traditional items now
available during the winter may adversely affect
consumption of the tradhional fresh winter fruits
and vegetables. Furthermore, while per capita
fresh produce consumption has indeed expanded,
by 14 percent between 1980 and 1988, part of
this growth has simply been a shift from canned
fruits and vegetables to fresh. Hence, wider
availability of fresh fruits and vegetables during
the winter months may have a further adve~e
affect on the demand for canned fruits and veget-
ables produced domestically.
New Mexican Production Regions
The case study approach can be useful in
examining emerging international relationships
in the vegetable indust~. One of the most
dynamic relationships is the evolving California-
Mexico connection. Traditionally, Mexico has
produced primarily winter vegetables and haa
competed most directly with Florida. For
example, in the case of tomatoes California does
not ship during the January to April period when
Mexico and Florida jointly supply the winter
market (see Figure 1). However, during the
1980s new vegetable production regions have
begun to emerge in northwestern Mexico, and
their shipping seasons overlap with southern
California. This changes the competitive
relationships between the two countries, On the
Journal of Food Distribution Research February 90/page 33.% a
February 90/page 34 Journal of Food Distribution Researchother hand, part of the production developing in
these new Mexican regions has been set up and
financed by California and Arizona growers. In
essence, a coordinated relationship is evolving to
meet the demand of U.S. buyers for a year-round
supply of produce.
Several commodities are instructive of the
new relationship between Mexico and the United
States. They are frozen broccoli and cauliflower,
and fresh market tomatoes, The new production
regions that will be emphasized are the Baja
Peninsula of Mexico and the Mexicali-San Luis
valleys which are located directly below the
Imperial Valley of California and the Yuma pro-
duction area of Arizona.
Agriculture in the Coastal Region of Bqja
The coastal production region of Baja
includes Ensenada and San Quintin and covers
60,000 hectares of farmland, about 18 percent of
which is in vegetable production. Tomato pro-
duction is concentrated in the San Quintin are%
about 150 miles south of the U.S.-Mexican bor-
der.
Irrigation in this area is from ground water
sources whose quality haa been declining. The
aquifer interfaces with sea water and a lack of
replenishing rain haa caused salinity levels to
increase markedly. Of the 700 wells located in
the San Quintin Valley, 50 percent exhibit salin-
ity levels of 2000 to 3000 part9 per million
(SARH, 1987). Due to the scarci~ and salini@
of water in the San Quintin area, local authori-
ties prohibit drilling new wells. Furthermore,
because suitable water is often not available at
the production sites, it has to be pumped several
miles, increasing the cost of farming in this area
(Cook and Amen).
Despite the severe water and land con-
straints, tomato production in Baja increased
dramatically in the 1980s. The production
increase is due to the adoption of drip irrigation
and improved yields, since acreage remained
stable as shown in Table 2. Despite the fixed
land base, tomato shipments from B~a grew
from 24,310,000 pounds in 1981 to 270,639,000
in 1988. This was equivalent ta 33 percent of
California shipments in 1988, up from 3 percent
in 1981 (see Table 3).
U.S. investment played a role in this
expansion, attracted by lower labor, water and
land costs. Regional shifts are occurring within
California as well, as urbanization pressures in
coastal areas and high water coats ($500/acre foot
in San Diego County) contribute to an expansion
in vegetable acreage in the central valley of
California. Table 4 shows the regional shifts in
fresh market tomato acreage in California.
Clearly San Diego experienced a significant
decline in acreage in the 1980s, and the develop-
ment of the vine-ripe tomato deal in Baja has
particular significance for San Diego because the
shipping seasons are almost completely over-
lapping. Since shipments from Baja are heaviest
from September through November (Figure 1),
the development of the tomato industry haa
severely encroached on the fall market window
formerly relied on by San Diego county. Yet
because many of the San Diego growers are now
operating in Bqj~ in essence there has just been
a shift in the location of production.
The interdependency of the Beja and
California vine-ripe tomato markets is demon-
strated by the incorporation of Mexican tomatoes
into the California state marketing order for
tomatoes. Any tomatoes handled in California
(regardless of origin) are subject to a handler
assessment. In this manner, out-of-state benefici-
aries of California tomato research who desire to
market in California must contribute to the
development of improved technology. By reduc-
ing the free rider issue of Baja grown tomatoes,
dissension over the expansion of this indue@ has
been ameliorated.
The rapid growth in Bqja vine-ripened
tomato exporta is partly the remilt of a significant
cost advantage relative to Southern California.
Aa shown in Table 5, in 1987 the estimated pro-
duction and packaging costs of San Quintin toma-
toes c.i,f. Chula Vista was $3,89 per carton
(grower interviews) vs. $5.10/carton for San
Diego, according to Schrader (1987).
While land rent and water costs ($60/acre
foot) are substantially lower in San Quintin than
San Diego, lower labor costs accounted for moat
of the cost differential. In 1987 wage rates for
tomato workera in Bqja averaged $3 per day vs.
$40 in San Diego. However, wage rates have
increased to $5 per day in B~a and c.i.f. Chula
Vista tomato production and packaging costs in
1989 were in the $4-$4.50/carton range. Trans-
portation coats are expected to increase in the
near future, further eroding the cost advantage.
Lack of rain in the coastal region in the
last two yeara is also seriously jeopardizing
vegetable production. New agricultural invest-
ment has come to a halt and further expansion
in tomato shipments is considered highly
unlikely. Total vegetable crop acreage has likely
peaked and growth in vegetables new to the
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1981-1986
Production Area 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
----------------------------------------- acres ~ ------------------------ ----------------
No. San Joaquin Valley 9,300 8,260 10,300 11,420 11,600 12,100 11,650
Cuttler-Omsi 5,160 5,010 3,700 4,520 5,800 7,500 7,450
Central Coast 5,000 5,060 4,400 3,400 3,200 3,200 3,400
south coast 7,840 8,960 7,500 7,120 4,340 3,450 3,030
knpmial Valley 1,200 1,250 1,360 1,450 1,500 1,300 1,000
Dther 2,000 1,560 1,440 1,390 1,460 1,050 2,070
state Total 30,500 30,100 28,700 29,300 27,900 28,600 28,600
time am equals 0.40 hectare.
Sources: California Crop and Livestock Reporting Service, Cahf “omia Vegetab e Crops, vtious issues, 1
1980-1985; California Agricultural Statistics Semite, ~ 1985-1986,
July 1987.












d yield of 2,5~ cartons/ac~.
Source: Grower interviews, Cook and Amen.
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expected at the expense of other vegetables.
The uncertain future of San Quintin is
causing producers to seek new land, particularly
in the state of Baja Sur or Southern Baja. Since
no other region in the Peninsula is suitable for
year-round vegetable production, several new
vegetable production regions are expected to
evolve to (partially) replace San Quintin.
Vegetable production is beginning to develop in
the Vizcaino area (500 miles south of the U.S.-
Mexican border), in the Ciudad Constitution area
(800 miles from the border), and in the La Paz
area (900 miles from the border).
Not surprisingly, transportation costs to
the border are significantly higher than from San
Quintin. For example, transportation costs for a
carton of tomatoes shipped from La Paz are $1.13
vs. $.35 from San Quintin. These higher trans-
portation costs eliminate most of the labor cost
advantage. In addition, labor availability is a
problem in Southern Baja and worker housing is
frequently unavailable in the areas where new
production is emerging. Growers must make
major investments in housing ($500,000 phs)
before attempting large scxde production. While
water costs are low in these new areas (about
$10/acre foot), purchased input costs are similar
to U.S. levels. Clearly, these Southern Baja
regions can only be competitive during periods of
low Us.supply. In otherwords, these new
regions are expected to be more of a factor dur-
ing the late winter and early spring, rather than
competing directly with Southern California grow-
ers during the spring through fall.
One of the crops experiencing growth is
asparagus in the Cd. Constitution area.
Asparagus can be shipped from this region
during the fall, before the Imperial Valley and
the Mexicali-San Luis valleys begin. Tomatoes,
melons, and peppers can be shipped from La Paz
during the winter, with heaviest volume in the
March to May period.
Yet the future of these areas as winter
vegetable suppliers to the U.S. marke~ is clouded
by the severely limited water supply, Rainfall
ranges from 100 ml./year in Vizcaino to 300 in
La Paz. Access to water is strictly controlled by
the Department of Agriculture (SARH). The gov-
ernment of the state of Southern Bsja has deter-
mined that the economic return per acre foot of
water is significantly higher from tourism than
from agriculture. Consequently, the rapid devel-
opment of the tourism industry in Southern B~a
will compete vigorously with agriculture for the
State’s limited water resources.
Vegetable Production
In the Mexicali-San Luis Valleys
While the MexicaU and San Luis valleys
overlap the state lines of Baja CaUfornia and
Sonora, they can essentially be considered as one
production region. The climate and soil
conditions are similar to desert growing areas
across the border and are suitable for most
vegetables during the winter season, except
tomatoes. The valleys together have 325,000
hectares of agricultural land, of which 207,000
hectares are irrigated (SARH, 1987). In 1989
horticultural production took place on 7 percent
of the available irrigated land, up from 5 percent
in 1987. To date the principal vegetable crops
produced in the Mexicali Valley are green onions
(2201 has), asparagus (2867 has), 504 hectares of
radishes, and 2387 hectares of melons and water-
melons (SARH, 1988).
Research done at CIANO (Center for
Agricultural Research in the Northwest) in
Sonora indicates that the net return per cubic
feet of water is three times higher for most
vegetable and fruit crops than for field crops.
Consequently, there are incentives to change the
crop mix and increase vegetable production. The
proximity of the Mexicali-San Luis valleys to the
border puts this area in a better position to
exploit the growing demand for fresh vegetables
than some of the new production regions emerg-
ing in Southern Baja. On the other hand, this
region has the disadvantage of directly
overlapping with production in the U.S. dese~
rather than extending shipping seasons.
Furthermore, despite the large size of the
Mexicali-San Luis valleys, high quality ground
suitable for growing vegetables is in limited
supply, and water availability is increasingly
becoming a problem. Besides Colorado River
water there are some 700 deep wells, but access
to those wells is becoming difficult. This con-
straint is reportedly causing some Imperial Valley
growers to diminish their presence there.
Another threat to the development of the veget-
able industry in the Mexicali-San Luis valley is
a canal project proposed by the U.S. Department
of the Interior. This project would reline a 66
mile section of the All-American Canal, poten-
tially reducing Mexico’s indirect access to
Colorado River water by 32.6 billion gallons per
year. Hence, the extent to which vegetable pro-
duction can continue to expand in this area is
unclear.
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From Mexico
A m~or vegetable freezing industry has
developed in the Bqjio area of central Mexico.
This industry was established and financed in
the early sixties by U.S. processing firms (Heinz,
Del Monte, Campbells, etc.). The firms adapted
technology to the region and trained growers to
produce to specifications on a contract basis.
Today there is a large pool of growers in central
Mexico experienced in broccoli and cauliflower
production and several Mexican firms have
become significant suppliers of the U.S. market.
Many of these also have access to sufficient
capital to consider alternative marketing strate-
gies, such as production for the fresh market
(Moulton and Runeten).
Since broccoli is a dual usage crop, the
phenomenal growth in Mexican frozen broccoli
exporta to the United States as shown in Table
6 (from 27,747,000 lbs. in 1983 to 164,416,000
lbs. in 1987) has adversely affected the U.S. fresh
broccoli market as well. Specifically, Mexico has
captured a 32.4 percent share of the U.S. market
for frozen broccoli, thereby limiting the extent to
which producers can divert production to the
processing market when low prices prevail in the
fresh market. A similar situation exists for cauli-
flower, with Mexico’s share of the U.S. market
increasing from 14.4 percent in 1983 to 41.0 per-
cent in 1987, larger than the California share.
Frozen asparagus imports from Mexico
have also experienced major growth. While
imports are still minor relative to total U.S.
consumption, they have increased fourfold from
1,044,302 lbs. in 1980 to 4,575,493 in 1987
(Pradhan and Moulton).
Although U.S. imports of frozen broccoli
and asparagus from Mexico stabilized in 1988,
Mexico’s competitive position appears strong.
Moulton and Runeten indicate that the robust
nature of competition from Mexico is derived
from low labor costs, good capitilzation, current
technology and good access to the U.S. market.
As indicated in Table 7, total broccoli production
costs in Mexico are less than pre-harveet costs in
the U.S.
Whale fuel, fertilizer and other energy
sources are subsidized, their elimination would
be unlikely to reduce Mexico’s coat advantage
resulting from lower labor coats. And Moulton
and Runeten conclude that exchange rate fluc-
tuations are unlikely to significantly affect
Mexico’s competitive position, given the con-
tinuing expansion in exports in the face of a
decline in the undervaluation of the peso. Cer-
tainly the development of efficient export mar-
keting channels by the multi-national firms
greatly facilitates the movement of Mexican
product into the U.S. market.
The growth in frozen broccoli and cauli-
flower imports from Mexico has had an adverse
effect on independent processors operating only
in Californi% reducing profits and employment.
Yet the fragmented structure of the broccoli
industry and the lack of industry-wide organiza-
tion via a marketing order or commission has
inhibited the ability of the California industry to
develop effective competitive responses.
The Importance of Industry Structure
And Organization
Industry structure and organization appear
to have an important Mfect on the competitive
position of California agri-industries. It is
instructive to compare and contrast the frozen
vegetable industry with the frozen strawberry
industry.
When the Bracero program ended in the
1960s, California feared a loss of the strawbeny
industry to Mexico due to the highly labor-
intensive nature of strawberry production. In
reality, California has continued to gain market
share relative to both Mexico and other regions
of the United States (Runsten). California has a
state strawberry marketing order and has con-
sistently invested in the varietal development and
other research areas necessary to retin a tech-
nological advantage (the 1988-89 research budget
of the Strawberry Advisory Board was $642,000).
Figure 2 shows the gap in strawberry yields
which has developed since the 1950s between
California and Mexico and the Pacific Northwest.
California also has a generic promotion and
advertising program for strawberries with a 1988-
89 budget of $2.5 million. Neither Mexico nor
any other state has an organized industry-wide
research and promotional program of any
significance.
Another relevant factor is the structure of
the California strawberry indu~. The
California industry is composed of many medium
size firms and grower cooperatives and is not
dominated by a single firm capable of
transferring technology to Mexico on a significant
scale.
In contrae$ the frozen vegetable industry
is comprised of several large multi-national firms
with sufficient resources to affect the overall
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Broccoli
California Market Other Market Imports from Market Imports from Market Other
Pack Share U.S. Share Mexico Share Guatemala Share Imports Total
Year 1,000 lb Percent 1,000 lb Percent 1,000 lb Percent 1,000 lb Percent 1,000 lb 1,000 lb
1978 265,088 90.8 11,431 3.9 13,930 4.8 1,475 0.5 57 291,981
1979 298,618 95.1 -o- 0 12)213 4.2 2,149 0.7
1980
88 314,069
290,65’7 92.4 -o- 0 19,110 6.1 4,607 1.5 181 314,555
1981 288,700 86.3 18,055 5.4 22,542 6.7 5,161 1.5
1982 303,850
120 334,578
82.7 31,666 8.6 26,759 7.3 4,675 1.3 436 367,386
1983 260,359 81.6 24,999 7.8 27,747 8.7 3,238 1.0 2)566 318,909
1984 327,535 76.0 38,229 8.9 55,318 12.8 10,023 2.3 63 431,168
1985 309,836 71.4 46,970 10.8 63,376 14.6 12,666 2.9 1,105 433,953
1986 275,159 62.3 49,360 11.2 96,837 21.9 18,124 4.1 2,189 441,669
1987 261,903 51.6 50,557 10.0 164,416 32.4 27,844 5.5 2,559 507,279
Cauliflower
California Market Other Market Imports from Market Imports from Market Other
Pack Share U.S. Share Mexico Share Guatemala Share Imports Total
Year 1,000 lb Percent 1,000 lb Percent 1,000 lb Percent 1,000 lb Percent 1,000 lb 1,000 lb
1978 96,771 68.1 30,742 21.7 11,808 8.3 1,914 1.4 448 141,683
1979 76,957 69.2 24,173 21.8 5,887 5.3 3,969 3.6 153 111,139
1980 66,369 70.2 18,397 19.5 6,060 6.4 3,642 3.9 19 64,487
1981 85,370 71.9 19,791 16.7 10,412 8.8 3,090 2.6 72 118,735
1982 85,339 64.5 26,305 19.9 13,306 10.1 7,083 5.4
1983 71,779 59.0
181 132,214
28,762 23.6 17,571 14.4 3,238 2.7 276 121,626
1984 72,062 54.2 30,044 22.6 27,559 20.7 3,069 2.3 206 132,940
1985 67,074 51.0 27,543 21.0 32,869 25.0 2,835 2.2
1986
1,119 131,940
64,631 50.9 24,489 19.8 24,347 27.1 2,159 1.7
1987
1,337 126,963
51,244 37,6 26,514 19.5 55,878 41.0 1,614 1.2 1,023 136,273
‘Before U.S. exporta, which are mainly to Canad% ignores carry-over stocks.
SOURCES: American Frozen Food Institute, Frozen Food Pack Statistics, various years; U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, U.S. Imports for Consumption, Schedule E.
Februa~ 90/page 40 Journal of Food Distribution ResearchTable 7. Estimating Costs to Produce Broccoli in Mexico and California, 1986 al
Mexico bl California cl
-------------------U.S. dbllarsper acre -----------------
Pre-harvest $268.77 $799.09
Overhead 91.00 161.00
Hmest &Transport 64.62 450.00
Fixed Costs 54.00 95.50
Total Costs $478.39 $1,505.59




Mexican costs are for Guanajuato, calculated in June 1986 California costs are 1986
University of California sample costs with wages and land rents adjusted downward to reflect
actual practice.
Based on an average payable yield of 7,316 pounds/acre (8.2 metric tons/hectare) from 1983
survey yields may be higher now, although the same varieties are being grown.
Based on the California 1986 average broccoli yield of 1O,(MO pound~acre (11.2 mernc
tondhectare).
Sources: For Mexico, Kirby Moulton and David Runsten, “
- University of California Cooperative Ex~98@ for
California, various Cooperative Extension sample cost studies and interviews with
growers.
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does not benefit from an organized program sup-
porting research and/or promotion such as
through a marketing order.
Maquiladoras for Vegetables
Another example of the emerging rela-
tionship between California and Mexico in the
vegetable industry is the recent decision of the
California Department of Food and Agriculture
(CDFA) to approve the establishment of a
“maquiladora” in Mexico to package carrots grown
in the Imperial Valley and destined for the U.S.
market. The maquiladora concept haa been heav-
ily used by U.S. manufacturing firms.
Maquiladorae import inputs into Mexico duty-
free, assemble the products there to take
advantage of low labor costs, and then pay du@
only on the value-added in Mexico when
“exporting to the U.S. market.
The application of the maquiladora concept
to agriculture is new and haa interesting implica-
tions. For vegetable crops which are not highly
labor-intensive at the production and harvesting
levels, Mexico may not have a significant cost
advantage. For these crops the greatest potential
for cost savings may be in the packaging stage.
Hence, it could be co,~si&red advantageous by
California and Arizona growers to produce in the
less risky U.S. environment and merely package
in Mexico (for crops that aren’t highly perish-
able). Indeed, the marketing and infrastructure
advantages of producing in California may make
this a common scenario for those operating close
to the border.
Marketing Strategies for California
And Mexican Vegetable Growers
Traditionally, California haa pursued a
marketing strategy of operating as a high volume,
least cost producer. Yet California can no longer
be described as the least cost producer for many
vegetable crops. An alternative strategy pursued
by a growing number of California grower-ship-
pers is that of targeting the product attribute
market for differentiated products.
The entrance of new players into the fresh
vegetable industry is also affecting the marketing
environment in California. Due to the decline in
consumption of canned fruits and vegetables,
many processors (e.g. Dole, Campbell’s, Pillsbury-
Green Gian& KrafG Del Monte) have entered the
fresh market during the 1980s and have brought
with them their branded marketing mentalities.
Successful branding of produce is difficult because
of the following requirements 1) year-round
availability of produ~, 2) a consistent high qual-
ity supply, 3) a differentiated produti, and
4) proper handling throughout the cold chain.
Without these conditions a consumer brand
(~ opposed to a trade label) is not economically
wable, since the development of a “consumer
franchise” for a product requires costly consumer
advertising. This kind of investment would not
be profitable for a product available only season-
ally, for example. The growth of contra-seasonal
imports is reducing this constraint but because
of the perishability of fresh produce, the industry
is still grappling with the other requirements.
Yet clearly, as the large firms invest in consumer
brands and tackle the obstacles, they will depend
on foreign imports to fill the gaps when U.S.
supplies are low. This is a powerful force in
favor of imports.
Because of the difficulty of clearly dif-
ferentiating produce, given the variable intra- and
inter-seasonal quality, brands may have a higher
success rate if they are associated with value-
-added products such as pre-cut and
microwaveable products. Hence, consumer
interest in convenience oriented products and
industry interest in branded marketing may offer
an advantage to the larger firms with past brand
marketing experience and large resource pools.
As a result the introduction of brands is
expected to affect indushy structure at the
shipping point level. Smaller firms with insuffi-
cient capital to invest in consumer brands or
without sophisticated qualiiy control programs in
their foreign operations may be at a disadvantage
in a branded environment.
Yet the success of brands in produce
remains to be seen. It has not been demon-
strated that the mqjority of retailera will support
brands and pay a price premium. Survey data
from the Food Marketing Institute/Produce
Marketing Association show a lack of consensus
on the part of retailers on the benefits of brands.
Retailers do respond favorably to branded prod-
ucts as an informational merchandising tech-
nique, where the physical brand label or package
includes recipes, ripening or nutritional informa-
tion.
Although the abilily of shippera to develop
successful consumer franchises is uncertain,
branding will bring both an advertising and infor-
mational/merchandising jolt to produce. This
may be an important competitive factor for
exporting countries attempting to penetrate the
U.S. market and raises an interesting question
with regard to marketing strategies. Will coun-
tries such as Mexico continue to pursue a least
Journal of Food Distribution Research Febraary W/page 43cost high volume strategy or will they attempt to
forward integrate into the US. market and
develop branded, value-added products?
Mexico’s ability to move into value-added,
convenience oriented products may be limited by
the costly market research and sophisticated
packaging and postharvest technology required.
If Mexico is to pursue these strategies it may be
merely as part of the supplier network for large
U.S. firms who set the specifications and transfer
the technolo~.
Conclusions
The internationalization of the fruit and
vegetable industry and changing consumer
demand is ushering in a new marketing era.
While imporls are expanding rapidly, much of
this production haa been set up and financed by
sectors of California agriculture itself, The pro-
pensity of many California firms to shift
operations out-of-state and out-of-country makes
it difficult for the state’s agricultural industry to
speak with one voice.
Compelling demand and supply side factors
favor a continuation of the transfer of some of
California’s production capaci~ to other areas.
Yet in the case of Mexico, many constraints limit
the extent to which production can be trans-
ferred. California’s natural advantages of diverse
climates and long growing seasons, combined
with highly developed production, postharvest
and distribution technology, insure California
agriculture’s importance in the fruit and
vegetable industry. Although the location of the
production may change, California firms are
bound to continue to play a major role in the
financing and marketing of production from new
regions. Yet in order to maintain a leadership
role, Cfllfornia must continually invest in the
research and development necesamy for a
competitive advantage, and must look to innova-
tive marketing strategies emphasizing high
qua.My, differentiated products.
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